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IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES: COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES
AND MODERN TRENDS
M. C. SLOUGHt
One of the most interesting facets of trial experience is the examina-
tion of witnesses for here one is constantly doing battle against the frail-
ties and inconsistencies of the human element. The trier of fact, be it
judge or jury, is not in a position to investigate and must constantly rely
upon human assertions which in turn derive from human qualities. The
usual forces that determine moral character, bias, interest, power of
memory, and perception well from a complex of emotional influences
and intellectual stimuli too vast for perfect comprehension. Legal scholars
have long been cognizant of the difficulties inherent in our reliance upon
testimony of witnesses, and ever so gradually rules of evidence have
been devised to minimize the inadequacies rooted in testimonial proof.'
Non-lawyer critics, undoubtedly reflecting the bias of their own
professional ideals, have been unduly harsh in their appraisal of tradi-
tional and contemporary legal methods for extracting truth. Viewed in
a cold scientific light, the rules of evidence are inevitably too general and
run to over-simplification in terms of the personality equation. As far
as witness credibility is concerned, little effort is expended in examining
the psychological basis of testimony elicited and investigatory procedures
aimed at culling out the accuracies or inaccuracies of testimonial asser-
tions are flimsily contrived. Yet critics of the contemporary legal scene
just as often fail to realize that the modern trial is a swift moving thing.
A complete and accurate investigatory process at the trial level would
necessitate an elaborate scheme of evaluation requiring the services of
many psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, and workers in allied
disciplines. As a result the cost of litigating would be burdensome and
t Dean, University of Kansas School of Law.
1. WmmRE. THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF § 190 (3d ed. 1937).
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court dockets already brimful would present a spectre of unrelieved
congestion.2
Since the dawn of the adversary system rules of evidence have been
fashioned in general terms to meet the exigencies of of an infinite variety
of cases. For purposes of impeachment, counsel have been permitted to
test and attack credibility in a number of ways: by proving that a wit-
ness has been inconsistent in his assertions, by pointing up bias, interest,
or conscious false intent, by openly attacking the witness' character. Just
as surely as methods of impeachment were constructed and refined, cer-
tain protective forces were at work, dedicated to the task of dignifying
the role of witnesses and restraining the ardor of adversary interests.
Thus the idea became current that a party vouched for the credibility of
a witness whose testimony he introduced. Attacks upon the moral obli-
quities of a witness were curtailed by censoring references to general
moral character and by narrowing the scope of inquiry into past in-
famous deeds and misadventures. Concomitantly there developed an
unctuous but easily circumvented rule of exclusion which forbade refer-
ence to collateral offenses when one stood trial for a criminal offense.
Evidence of character became confined to general reputation and in-
dividual opinion or evaluation was banned from the courtroom scene.
In the interest of saving time and in the interest of minimizing the spec-
tacular and softening the rude shock of prejudice, an elaborate web of
rules evolved. The very fact that many of these concepts have survived
for centuries bespeaks the wisdom and experience of many great persons.
Procedural innovations of recent vintage have overhauled and im-
proved traditional modes of fact finding and have tended to eliminate
certain areas of surprise and doubt inherent in our adversary system of
litigation. By resorting to pre-trial conferences and discovery devices
the modern lawyer is in a position to gauge the worth of his own wit-
nesses and to test the strength or weakness of his opponent's case. Later
trends also indicate that the legal profession is willing to accept the
contributions of other professional groups, particularly as they affect the
outcome of trial procedures. Yet, despite radical changes in certain
areas of the fact finding pattern there is strong evidence of growing
dissatisfaction with the baseless inflexibility of orthodox doctrines. Aside
from the fact that present rules of evidence with respect to witness ex-
amination are oversimplified and unrealistic, it is quite evident that there
is a tragic lack of uniformity in their application. The courts must seek
2. Weinstein, The Law's Attempt to Obtain Usefid Testimony, 13 (no. 2) JOURNAL.
OF SoCIAL IssuEs 6 (1957) ; Levin and Levy, Persuading the Jury dth Facts Not in
Evidence: The Fiction-Science Spectrum, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 167 (1956).
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out a realstic solution, utilizing the best available knowledge at hand,
whether it be legal or scientific. Many of these traditional concepts
were wisely formulated on the basis of information obtaining at the time
of their inception, but the ensuing years have witnessed an accumulation
of knowledge that clearly points to the invalidity of many original
principles.
It would indeed be beyond the scope of this article to analyze and
criticize a major portion of these rules that guide and restrict the lawyer
in his search for absolute truth. On the other hand, a particularized
reference to restricted areas of conflict may well illustrate the equivocal
values of present day trial techniques. The total subject is necessarily
complicated by differences of opinion among the many American juris-
dictions. These differences in turn are aided and abetted by ambiguous
exceptions and definitions welling out of equally ambiguous precedents
and piecemeal legislation. If for no other reason, an analysis of this sort
is beneficial in that it demonstrates the folly of reliance upon general
rules without resort to sedulous examination of precedents.
Impeachment of One's Own Witness
There is actually no agreement as to the origin of the common law
rule forbidding a party to impeach his own witness.' Dean Wigmore
has suggested that the rule may have taken root in the medieval trials by
compurgation where a party established his plea if a prescribed number
of helpers swore that he told the truth.4 Since these oath helpers were
chosen from among the kinsmen and adherents of the party involved, it
was unthinkable that a party would take any stand against his helpers.
Under the civil and canon laws the rule was well established that one
who employed a witness for his own purposes could not thereafter ob-
ject to his incompetency.' Dean Ladd suggests that a more probable
origin of the rule can be traced in the transition from the inquisitorial
method of trial as it evolved into an adversary system.' His theory
seems plausible as it was not until the jury became judges of the evi-
3. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 896-918 (3d ed. 1940); Ladd, Impeachment of One's
Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U. Cmi. L. REv. 69 (1936); McCormick, The
Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEXAS L. Rxv. 573
(1947); Schatz, Inpeachment of One's Om; Witness: Present New York Law and
Proposed Changes, 27 CORNELL L. Q. 377 (1942).
4. 3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 896 (3d ed. 1940).
5. Precise information is not available, though it appears by inference in the Code
Justinian that a party under the Roman Law could not generally impeach his own wit-
ness. For an accurate historical account of the supposed origins of the rule against
impeachment, see the opinion by Blume, J., in Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 202 Pac.
1099 (1922).
6. Ladd, supra note 3, at 70.
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dence alone, apart from personal knowledge of issues involved, that
witnesses in the modern sense appeared. In this manner, Dean Ladd
accounts for the absence of reported cases involving the impeachment
rule until the seventeenth century and its first reported application in
Fitzharris' Trial1 a century after compurgation had fallen into disuse.'
Various reasons have been assigned for perpetuation or justification
of the rule: that the party by calling a witness is morally bound by the
statements of his witness ;9 that the party by calling a witness vouches
for or guarantees the trustworthiness of his testimony;1" that the party
calling a witness should be prohibited from coercing or controlling his
testimony." Obviously a party is not morally bound by the testimony
of his witness; hence this primitive ethical basis for exclusion became
moribund early in the nineteenth century. In a very practical sense, this
exclusionary principle clashed with another corollary of the impeachment
rule which permitted contradiction on material issues."
One may inch closer to reality by asserting that a party vouches for
his witness or represents him worthy of belief, but the vouching idea
fares poorly on strict analysis. The great nineteenth century authority
Simon Greenleaf wrote in terms of guarantees and vouchings, even to
the point of stating that one is presumed to know the character of the
witnesses he adduces.' 3 Despite general criticism, the vouching theory
obtains in modern opinions just as it did a century ago, and for lack of a
better chant, it continues as a weak and riddled article of faith. 4 In a
practical sense, one may vouch for the credibility of an expert witness or
of a character witness hand-picked to prove a definite point. But the
personal injury litigant and the prosecutor are driven to accept indi-
viduals as witnesses who have observed the facts in issue. Fate has
7. 8 How. St. Tr. 223, 369, 373 (1681).
8. "[W]hen the trial became completely adversary in character the rule for-
bidding impeachment remained a logical concomitant of it, whether consciously af-
fected by the analogy of compurgation or not." Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary
Rudes of Evidence, 4 U. Cm. L. REv. 247, 258 (1936).
9. 3 WIGaoE, EVIDENCE § 897 (3d ed. 1940).
10. Wilson v. Prettyman, 195 Iowa 598, 192 N.W. 413 (1923); Pollock v. Pollock,
71 N.Y. 152 (1877); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 38 (1954).
11. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 899 (3d ed. 1940) ; Ladd, supra note 3, at 80.
12. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Everett, 232 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1956). All
authorities agree that a party shall have the right to contradict his own witness by call-
ing other witnesses to prove a fact material to the issues even though the necessary
effect is one of impeachment. See generally, 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 907 (3d ed. 1940).
13. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 442 (1866).
14. "As a general rule, a party to a lawsuit voluntarily calling a witness to the
stand vouches for his credibility and cannot impeach him except as that result may be
incidentally accomplished by proving a state of facts differing from that sworn to by
the witness." McCray v. Illinois Central Railroad, 12 Ill. App.2d 425, 139 N.E.2d 817,
822 (1957).
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ordered that certain persons, good or bad, shall observe certain events,
and just as surely fate does not order that these observations be truth-
fully revealed.
Courts have unanimously rejected the idea that a party vouches for
witnesses whom he is under a duty to call. The proponent of a will is
obliged to call the attesting witnesses regardless of the fact that he might
distrust them and desire to call persons of more reputable strain. Very
clearly these are necessary witnesses in a legal sense and the proponent
is everywhere afforded the luxury of impeachment should testimony
prove adverse. A like rule applies in criminal cases, where the prosecu-
tion is under a legal duty to call witnesses whose names are indorsed on
the indictment or information. In absence of an express legal duty
courts have at times been willing to concede that a party may be com-
pelled in a practical sense to call certain witnesses and have permitted im-
peachment on that basis when the situation demanded such action.' "
Looking at the matter from a common sense point of view it would seem
that many, if not most, witnesses are necessary in terms of obtaining a
truthful account of the facts. However, at this juncture it would appear
that judicial conservativism prefers to attach undue importance to pre-
cise legal tabs, practicalities notwithstanding. 6
The third reason assigned for perpetuating the common law rule
has an impressive and honored tradition and has been quoted frequently
in American opinions.' It is founded on the proposition that the power
to impeach implies the power to destroy. Reasoning thusly, one could
coerce his witness to testify as desired, because he would be in a position
to destroy the witness' credit if he dared to speak against him. The chief
failing of this coercion theory lies in an assumption that all witnesses
who give damaging testimony are testifying to the truth. It assumes
that all unfavorable statements made out of court are truthful in content
and that counsel, armed with the power to impeach, invariably attempt
to coerce their witnesses into rendering false testimony. It further as-
sumes that all or most witnesses are consumed with an innate fear of
15. Meeks v. United States, 179 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1950) (prosecution compelled
to call witness to establish premeditation; impeachment allowed); Commonwealth v.
Sarkis, 164 Pa. Super. 194, 63 A.2d 360 (1949) (prosecution compelled to call victim of
aggravated assault as a witness for the Commonwealth, though not absolutely required
by law; impeachment permitted).
16. The prohibition of impeachment does not apply to situations where one calls
the adverse party as a witness. In addition to statutory provisions for the pre-trial
examination of adverse parties and witnesses, the practice codes and statutes of most
jurisdictions provide that a party may be called by his adversary and examined as on
cross-examination as to any relevant facts in issue. FED. R. CiV. P. 43(b); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 2-1728 (Burns Supp. 1957) ; Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 756 (1954).
17. Cox v. Eayres, 55 Vt. 24 (1883).
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impeachment and will be willing to repudiate the truth to escape almost
certain character assassination. As a matter of fact most witnesses suf-
fer from an assorted variety of inhibitions when testifying in court, but
it is quite another thing to insist that honest and reputable witnesses are
affected unduly by conscious fears of impeachment. In reality the
average witness is quite unaware of the rules which permit or deny
impeachment, and as usual the legal mind is prone to give him more
credit than he rightfully deserves.
The deceitful and dishonest witness has much to fear from impeach-
ment when he strays from the truth, and no one should quarrel with his
being exposed if deception is revealed. It is common knowledge in these
times that witnesses are on occasion paid for their testimony, particularly
in criminal cases where gang domination and control are evident. Sym-
pathy for the accused figures high in criminal prosecutions, causing wit-
nesses to change their testimony when they realize that they are condon-
ing if not forcing conviction. Prohibiting impeachment by the offering
party puts him at a tactical disadvantage inasmuch as the opposing party
can always attack the witness' credibility, and all too frequently the op-
posing party will decide what the jury shall hear. Indeed this is an un-
fair advantage which the originators of the rule could not have con-
templated, otherwise the rule would have failed for lack of a sponsor."
The strict common law rule of prohibition, like most rules of law
that have outlived their usefulness, has faced gradual nullification. Thus
courts have long held that a party's own witness could be examined, call-
ing his attention to former statements made, for the purpose of refresh-
ing his recollection." Nor is it uncommon for judges to allow leading
questions to be put to witnesses who have demonstrated a talent for for-
getting things past.2" Obviously these tactics do not bear the stigma of
impeachment, but distinctions between memory probing and outright
impeachment can be more tenuous than real.
Major limitations upon the non-impeachment doctrine have resulted
from legislative action. In 1849, David Dudley Field, of New York,
attempted a radical change in the impeachment rule by incorporating two
18. Judge May, writing in 1877, carefully delineated the weakness of the coercion
concept. "[I]f he betrays the party who calls him and falsifies every statement which
he makes, the opposite party will of course accept the treason, say nothing of impeach-
ment and leave the jury no alternative but to find an unjust verdict upon evidence which
both parties know to be the rankest perjury. . . . Nobody can profit by the rule but
the witness and the antagonist of the party who calls him and they only by the defeat
of the ends of justice." May, Some Rules of Evideiwe, 11 Ams. L. REv. 261, 270 (1877).
19. People v. Michaels, 335 Ill. 590, 167 N.E. 857 (1929) ; People v. Purtell, 243
N.Y. 273, 153 N.E. 72 (1926) ; Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 202 Pac. 1099 (1922).
20. BUSCH, LAW AND TAcTIcs IN JURY TRIALs § 266 (1949); MAGUIRE, Evi-
DENcE-COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 44 (1947).
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sections into his proposed Code of Civil Procedure. One section pro-
vided that a party should not be allowed to impeach the credit of his
witness by evidence of bad character, but should be permitted to contra-
dict him by other evidence, which would include a showing that the wit-
ness had at other times made statements inconsistent with his present
testimony. The other section provided for impeachment by proof of
statements inconsistent with present testimony provided proper founda-
tion was laid. Too radical for contemporary consumption these provi-
sions were rejected in New York but became law, in substance, in Eng-
land with the passage of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854.21
Four American jurisdictions, Florida, New Mexico, Vermont, and
Virginia have passed legislation in substance identical to the English
Act, incorporating the English provision that the witness must prove to
be adverse.2  In 1869 a statute was enacted in Massachusetts providing
that a party may prove that his witness has at other times made state-
ments inconsistent with his present testimony.2  The Massachusetts
statute, in turn, has furnished the basis for legislation in at least eight
jurisdictions. " Two of these jurisdictions allow evidence of bad charac-
ter if the witness is indispensable.2" Statutory provisions in Louisiana
and Texas apply only in criminal cases, though judicial decisions make
the rules applicable in civil cases as well.28 The Wisconsin statute applies
only to criminal proceedings but restricts impeachment to situations
where the judge regards the witness as hostile and where the statement
itself is in writing or in the form of a phonographic report.2 Wisconsin
will permit impeachment without benefit of statute in civil matters, sub-
ject to the discretion of the trial judge.2 ' Two statutory provisions in
New York sanction impeachment by prior inconsistent statements, how-
ever, the strength of these provisions is in large part dissipated by a re-
21. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125 § 22 (1854).
22. FLA. STAT. § 90.09 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-4 (1953); VT. REv. STAT.§ 1743 (1947) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-292 (1950).
23. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233 § 23 (1956).
24. ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 58-4-49 (1949); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-706
(1947); CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 2049; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-1207 (1948); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 2-1726 (Burns 1946); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-1901 to -8 (1947); ORE.
REv. STAT. § 45.590 (Supp. 1955); WYo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 3-2606 (1945). For many
years, Kentucky followed the Massachusetts practice, however, Ky. R. Civ. P. 43.07
(1953) eliminates the distinction between impeachment of a party's own witness and
impeachment of other witnesses.
25. Aax. STAT. ANN. § 28-706 (1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1726 (Burns 1946).
26. LA. REv. STAT. § 15:487 (1950); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 732 (1941).
Leadman v. Querbes, 163 So. 745 (La. App. 1935) ; Federal Underwriters Exchange v.
Rattler, 192 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). McCoRMICK AND RAY, TEXAS LAW OF
EvIDENCE § 689 (1956).
27. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 325.35 (1958).
28. In re Krause's Estate, 241 Wis. 41, 4 N.W.2d 122 (1942).
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quirement that the prior statements be in writing or under oath.2" The
District of Columbia and Georgia allow impeachment by proof of incon-
sistent statements in the event that counsel is surprised or entrapped by
the witness being examined."0 Statutory provisions in twelve jurisdic-
tions sanction impeachment of one's own witness but only when the wit-
ness is an adverse party.3 ' Judicial decisions in these states have ex-
tended the scope of impeachment to other witnesses. 2 In other jurisdic-
tions, the courts, without aid of statute, have modified the common law
rule, permitting impeachment under varying conditions.3 3
Statutes and case precedents which have liberalized the common law
rule of prohibition refer largely to impeachment by prior inconsistent
statements. Therefore counsel will not be allowed to attack the credi-
bility of his own witnesses by producing evidence of bad moral character,
or evidence of bias, interest, or corruption. 4 Despite the liberalizing
force of statutory enactments, a general feeling persists that a party
should not be granted the license of impeaching the character of his
witnesses, and undoubtedly a point of policy may be raised in defense of
the restrictive rule. If a party is not precluded from attacking the charac-
ter of his witness, he will be in a position to bring pressure to bear upon
his witnesses. This policy argument may convince momentarily until
one reflects upon the favored position of the adversary party who can
attack at will. Nor is it likely that a party will with frequence indulge
29. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 343-a; N.Y. CODE CRiai. PRoc. § 8-a. The present New
York law adopted in 1936 is far less ambitious than the provisions of the original Field
proposals. See Ladd, supra note 3, at 91-94; Schatz, supra note 3, at 386.
30. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-104 (1951) (impeachment permitted if party producing
witness has been taken by surprise); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1801 (1954) (impeachment
permitted if witness entraps the party calling him).
31. ARiz. R. Clv. P. 43(g) (1956); CoLo. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 153-1-16 (1953);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 60 (1957); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 113, § 118 (1954); MicH.
STAT. ANN. § 27.915 (1935); MiNN. R. Civ. P. 43.02 (1957); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1710
(1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.030 (1952); NEV. R. Civ. P. 43(b) (1953); N.H. Rxv.
STAT. ANN. 516:24 (1955) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.07 (Baldwin 1958) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28, § 381 (Purdon 1958). Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 756 (1954).
32. Missouri Pacific Railway v. Sullivan, 197 Ark. 360, 122 S.W.2d 947 (1938);
People v. Page, 28 Cal. App. 2d 642, 83 P.2d 77 (1938) ; People v. Quevreaux, 407 Ill.
176, 95 N.E.2d 62 (1950) ; People v. Cellura, 288 Mich. 54, 284 N.W. 643 (1939) ; Hag-
erty v. Radle, 228 Minn. 487, 37 N.W.2d 819 (1949) ; Commonwealth v. Sarkis, 164 Pa.
Super. 194, 63 A.2d 360 (1949) ; Note, 5 OHIO ST. L.J. 400 (1939).
33. Johnson v. Hager, 148 Kan. 461, 83 P.2d 621 (1938); Stappenbeck v. Jagels
Fuel Corp., 131 N.J.L. 215, 35 A.2d 631 (1944); Morton v. Hood, 105 Utah 484, 143
P.2d 434 (1943).
34. 3 WIGMORE, EViDENCE §§ 900, 901 (3d ed. 1940) ; Callahan and Ferguson, Evi-
dence and the New Federal Rides of Civil Procedure, 47 YALE LJ. 194, 201 (1937).
Most state statutes expressly prohibit impeachment of witness character by the calling
party. Arkansas, Indiana, and Kentucky allow evidence of bad character if the witness
is indispensable. See note 25 spra; Hill v. Goode, 18 Ind. 207 (1862) (holding that
a party may in given cases impeach his own witness by proof of bad character).
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in the privilege of attacking his witness' character by cross-examining
with respect to past crimes and misdeeds, by calling in character wit-
nesses, or by revealing strong bias and corruption. These attacks upon
witness character would be exceptional, and the equities of each case
might well rest within the ambit of judicial discretion."
Statutes and case precedents may have sanctioned impeachment by
proof of inconsistent statements, but ever so gradually, subtle, sometimes
useless limitations, have been grafted upon the liberating concept. As a
general rule, a party may not impeach his own witness unless it appears
that he has been surprised" by the testimony given, or that the testimony
elicited has been affirmatively prejudicial" or damaging" to his case.
The task of seeking out surprise, prejudice, and damaging effects can
become a futile wearisome affair, and more often than not, common
sense joined with sound judicial discretion can dictate accurate, positive
results. In the process of defining surprise and gauging the limits of
damage, judges are perforce reduced to the status of syllabus experts,
plagued by artificial distinctions that stifle intelligent consideration of
conditions as they actually exist.
Where a party in good faith has called a witness and is surprised
by adverse testimony, he may be allowed to cross-examine in the court's
discretion or he may call other witnesses to show that a statement was
previously made which contradicts present testimony."D However, im-
peaching matters must be limited to the point of surprise, and where ills
wrought by surprise have been remedied by cross-examination, it is im-
35. As far as impeachment is concerned there is often little practical distinction
between pointing up inconsistent statements, attacking character, or demonstrating bias
and corruption. The problem may be one of semantics alone as is evidenced by a half-
century old Kansas decision, State v. Moon, 71 Kan. 349, 80 Pac. 597 (1905). A wit-
ness before trial had informed the prosecution of statements made by the defendant
pertaining to the latter's plans to commit larceny. On the stand the witness denied
knowledge of these statements and the prosecution was granted the privilege of cross-
examination. After adjournment the witness was arrested for perjury. Next day he
retracted and on the stand retold his story with all the details of the defendant's sub-
ornation. Degrading as the attack might have been with respect to the witness' charac-
er, the procedure was upheld.
36. Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303 (1894); Young v. United States, 97
F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938) ; People v. Spinoza, 115 Cal. App.2d 659, 252 F.2d 409 (1953) ;
People v. Roach, 148 Cal. App. 2d 364, 306 P.2d 523 (1957) ; Delfino v. Warners Motor
Express, 142 Conn. 301, 114 A.2d 205 (1955) ; In re Houda's Estate, 79 N.W.2d 289
(S.D. 1956); Notes, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 178 (1954), 55 Micia. L. REv. 1180 (1957), 8
S.C.L.Q. 217 (1955).
37. Blum v. State, 196 Ind. 675, 148 N.E. 193 (1925) ; Walker v. State, 165 Ind.
94, 74 N.E. 614 (1905) ; Oldfather v. Zent, 21 Ind. App. 307, 52 N.E. 236 (1898).
38. State v. Lane, 69 Ariz. 236, 211 P.2d 821 (1949) ; People v. LeBeau, 39 Cal. 2d
146, 245 P.2d 302 (1952) ; State v. Perillo, 18 N.J. Super. 549, 87 A.2d 727 (App. Div.
1952). See also Annots., 117 A.L.R. 326 (1938), 74 A.L.R. 1042 (1931).
39. Banks v. United States, 204 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1953).
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proper to call other witnesses for the same purpose."0 Nor can a party
claim surprise and thereby acquire the right to impeach simply because
his witnesses do not testify as expected. 1
Only one matter is certain in this area of litigation: that courts have
been unable to agree as to the meaning of surprise. Too many decisions
have set up impossible requirements which deny contradiction when a
party has reasonable notice that the testimony of his witness will devi-
ate.42 In essence these decisions appear to require a complete lack of
awareness on the part of counsel that the witness will change his story.
Other courts, principally federal, have taken a realistic view of the situa-
tion, holding that prior notice alone is not sufficient to defeat a claim of
surprise, and thus do not regard surprise as the equivalent of being
taken unaware.43 These latter decisions rather look to see whether the
party was reasonably justified in expecting the witness to testify in a
favorable manner and place little stress upon the surprise-awareness
equation. Of particular value to the stock of precedents are those deci-
sions which pay scant homage to claims of surprise and place proper
emphasis upon the trial court's discretion.44
40. Forrester v. United States, 210 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1954).
41. People v. Williams, 104 Cal. App. 2d 323, 231 P.2d 554 (1951).
42. Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Gondek v. Pliska, 135
Conn. 610, 67 A.2d 552 (1949) ; State v. Johnson, 220 La. 1075, 58 So.2d 389 (1952) ;
In re Paradis' Will, 147 Me. 347, 87 A.2d 512 (1952); Thompson v. State, 97 Okla.
Crim. 253, 261 P.2d 900 (1953). As a condition precedent to claiming surprise, some
jurisdictions require that the prior statement be made to the party or his counsel. GA.
CODE ANN. § 38-1801 (Supp. 1951), Sparks v. State, 209 Ga. 250, 71 S.E.2d 608 (1952).
43. Weaver v. United States, 216 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1954) (court held that the
prosecution was surprised when the witness testified consistently with her Grand Jury
testimony, but contrary to her earlier statement to the F.B.I.) ; Wheeler v. United States,
211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954) (prosecution allowed
to impeach when witness' testimony at trial, contrary to her police report and Grand
Jury testimony, exculpated defendant, despite fact that defendant before trial had shown
police an exculpatory statement allegedly signed by witness) ; United States v. Graham,
102 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1939) (district attorney allowed to cross-examine witness as to
statement made at two former trials even though witness had told him that he would
not so testify and that statements were false) ; People v. Spinosa, 115 Cal. App. 2d 659,
252 P.2d 409 (1953) (witness prior to trial said that he did not commit a crime, then
later said that he did; at trial witness testified hat he did not commit the crime, and
prosecution allowed to impeach on ground that state had right to assume witness would
testify according to latest story); Commonwealth v. Bowers, 182 Pa. Super. 628, 127
A.2d 806 (1956) (immediately after alleged offense, rape victim signed statement ac-
cusing defendant; at trial victim repudiated statement and district attorney allowed to
impeach regardless of fact that defense counsel and victim had previously advised that
statement was not true). See 1957 ANN. Suavxy Am. L. 555, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 349
(1958).
44. "Where the trial court has permitted a party thus to cross-examine his own
witness, there should be no reversal on that account unless it can be made to appear
that justice was obstructed, and not furthered, thereby and that substantial prejudice
resulted. . . . The claim of surprise has become largely a gesture which adds little or
nothing to the trial court's discretion." London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Woelfle, 83
F.2d 325, 334 (8th Cir. 1936) ; Nuzum v. Springer, 97 Kan. 744, 156 Pac. 704 (1916).
IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES
In a significant number of jurisdictions it is stated that, in addition
to being surprising, the testimony of the witness must be damaging be-
fore impeachment will be permitted. " This added requirement assumes
that the only legitimate use of the prior inconsistent statement is to neu-
tralize testimony already given.46 Hence, where testimony elicited has
not appreciably damaged or hurt the proponent, there is nothing to im-
peach, or neutralize. This being the case, the prior statement serves no
proper evidentiary function and the jury can only misinterpret its validity.
Ambiguity is further served by a judicial rule of thumb which as-
serts that damage can only result when the witness gives affirmative testi-
mony regarding some material fact, i.e., testimony which asserts the ex-
istence or nonexistence of a material fact." A negative or doubtful re-
See cases collected in 3 WIGiioaE, EVIDENCE § 905 (3d ed. 1940). When a party desires
to present material testimony and is reluctant to assume the responsibility of calling a
witness, he may request the judge to call this person as a court witness, thereby circum-
venting retrictions on impeachment. Courts are at times willing to call witnesses on
their own initiative when it is apparent that neither side is willing to vouch for a wit-
ness' veracity. United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Kissic v. State,
266 Ala. 71, 94 So. 2d 202 (1957); People v. Hundley, 4 Ill. 2d 244, 112 N.E.2d 568
(1954) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 133 A.2d 187 (1957) (prosecution
not permitted to claim surprise upon failure of reluctant witness to testify as desired,
though impeachment difficulty could have been obviated had the court called the wit-
ness as its own) ; Note, 18 TEXAS L. REV. 530 (1940).
45. State v. Lane, 69 Ariz. 236, 211 P.2d 821 (1949) ; People v. Newson, 37 Cal.
2d 34, 230 P.2d 618 (1951); Hernandez v. State, 156 Fla. 356, 22 So. 2d 781 (1945);
Selden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 500, 43 A.2d 571 (1945) ; State v.
Swan, 25 Wash. 2d 319, 171 P.2d 222 (1946); 3 WlGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1043 (3d ed.
1940) ; McCoRmick, EVIDENCE § 38 (1954).
46. The rule is almost invariable that the right to impeach is limited to the pur-
pose of discrediting or neutralizing, and contradictory testimony may not be received as
independent or substantive evidence. Ellis v. United States, 138 F.2d 612 (8th Cir.
1943) ; Herr v. Erb, 163 Pa. Super. 430, 62 A.2d 75 (1948). Decisions are collected in
3 WIG ORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (3d ed. 1940) ; Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1454 (1941). McCor-
mick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEXAS
L. REv. 573 (1947); Notes, 62 DIcK. L. REV. 198 (1958), 8 MONT. L. REV. 39 (1947),
56 YALE L.J. 583 (1947). In most instances the rule is only of theoretical importance
as it is generally conceded that juries ignore instructions relating to the evidentiary
effect of contradictory statements. "The possibility that the jury may accept as the
truth the earlier statements in preference to those made on the stand is indeed real.. .. "
L. Hand, J. in Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268
U.S. 706 (1925). On the other hand, the current rule assumes practical significance
when the contradictory statement is the only material evidence available to support the
proponent's case. No affirmative evidence recorded, the case must fail. Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Frick v. Bickel, 115 Ind. App. 114, 54 N.E.2d 436, aff'd,
226 Ind. 610, 57 N.E.2d 62 (1944); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Hall, 184 Va. 102,
34 S.E.2d 382 (1945) ; cf. State v. Jolly, 112 Mont. 352, 116 P.2d 686 (1941) (dictum
supports contrary view).
47. A recent New Jersey decision, State v. Perillo, 18 N.J. Super. 549, 87 A.2d
727 (App. Div. 1952) illustrates the technical refinements of the rule. In a prosecu-
tion for conspiracy to keep a bookmaking establishment, the state called one Bucaro.
Asked if the defendant operated a horse room, Bucaro replied, "I wouldn't know." The
state then called witness Brown who testified that Bucaro had made a statement about
the defendant operating a horse room. Ruling that admission of Brown's testimony
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ply would not be sufficiently adverse to counsel's interest to qualify as
damaging testimony. Rulings of this genre of necessity generate and
breed technical judicial opinions dedicated to needless quibbling over
rhetorical refinements. How does one spell precise distinctions between
that which is affirmative and that which is negative, and furthermore
who can accurately declare that an "I did not" or a "he did not" is in-
evitably more damaging than an "I don't know" or "I don't remember"?
In attempting to gauge the damage potential of testimonial statements,
appellate courts are time and again more concerned with verbal form
than with the substance of information to be revealed.
Dissatisfaction with the status quo is becoming increasingly evident,
and two recent decisions illustrate current trends. In People v. LeBeau,"
the Supreme Court of California has essayed the damage requirement
with a fresh perspective. The defendant, charged with possession of
cocaine, testified that he knew nothing about narcotics and had never
been in contact with them. Asked by the prosecution if he had not told
one Nancy McDowell that he used cocaine, he replied no. In rebuttal,
the state called Nancy who also denied that the defendant had made such
a statement. She was then questioned as to whether she had not pre-
viously told the district attorney that Le Beau had made a statement to
her. She replied that she did not remember. Claiming surprise, the prose-
cution proceeded to impeach her testimony by calling a police inspector
who testified that Nancy had made a statement to the district attorney
with reference to the defendant's using cocaine. The Supreme Court
found no error in permitting the prosecution to impeach and ruled that
the state was damaged because the jury might conclude that the district
attorney was harassing the defendant and attempting to discredit him
without any basis in fact.49
The problem of the forgetful witness has been artfully resolved by
the Supreme Court of Utah in Morton v. Hood."° Mrs. Gertrude Mor-
ton, while crossing a highway in company with her granddaughter, Gretta
Churchill, was struck by the defendant's car. Two days after the acci-
was error, the appellate court labeled Bucaro's testimony "utterly harmless." The court
distinguished prior cases permitting impeachment where witnesses had been more defi-
nite in their responses, testifying in effect "that the defandant was not the man involved
in the crime." Though in negative form, a statement of the latter type would pass the
damage-potential test. See Peoples v. State, 257 Ala. 295, 58 So. 2d 599 (1952); Curme,
Dunn & Co. v. Rauh, 100 Ind. 247 (1884) (referring to IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1728
(Burns Supp. 1957) which permits impeachment of the forgetfull witness).
48. 39 Cal. 2d 146, 245 P.2d 302 (1952).
49. People v. LeBeau has been much discussed and reviewed. Notes, 40 CALiF. L.
REv. 609 (1952) (a critical commentary), 14 U. Pr. L. Rv. 275 (1952), 5 VAND. L.
REV. 658 (1952), 62 YALE LJ. 650 (1952).
50. 105 Utah 484, 143 P.2d 434 (1943).
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dent, Gretta gave statements in the presence of a court reporter which
constituted evidence highly favorable to the defendant. As a witness
called by the defendant her testimony in court tended to corroborate the
testimony of the plaintiff, and counsel for the defendant asked her about
statements allegedly made before the court reporter. While she did not
deny making these statements, she responded that she did not remember.
Defense counsel asked for leave to impeach her testimony by introducing
evidence relative to her prior statement, but the trial court denied this
request. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah ruled that denial of the
right to impeach in this instance was prejudicial error necessitating re-
versal of the judgment below. The majority opinion clearly noted that
no witness, intentionally or unintentionally, should be permitted to pre-
vent disclosure of material facts, either by refusing to answer or by fail-
ing to remember. Said the court: "If permitted to function, a conveni-
ent memory could readily defeat proof of prior contradictory statements
and testimony given at a time when the witness would be more likely
to remember how things happened with a greater degree of accuracy.""
The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, in Johnson v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,"2 has lately announced that a party is not bound
by the testimony of his own witness even though he is not an adverse
party. A railroad detective shot and killed a man whose administratrix
sued the railroad under a wrongful death statute. At the trial, the plain-
tiff called the detective as his own witness and the latter testified that
he killed in self defense. The plaintiff called the detective out of sheer
necessity after a suggestion by the trial judge that up to that time there
was not a sufficient case for recovery. Apparently the jury chose not
to believe the self defense story and returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
The defendant contended that the plaintiff should have been bound by
the testimony of the witness whom he called, and further contended that
the verdict should have been directed for the defendant since this testi-
mony was adverse to the plaintiff's case. Despite the fact that the wit-
ness' testimony was uncontradicted and that the plaintiff made no attempt
to impeach, the appellate court affirmed the verdict.5" The majority
51. Id. at 492, 143 P.2d at 437.
52. 208 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denized, 347 U.S. 943 (1954). In Moran v.
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950), this court interpreted
Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a party to impeach
the credibility of an adverse party he has called as a witness, to mean that the calling
party is not bound by an adversary witness' testimony.
53. In Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner, 127 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939),
the court stated that the plaintiff must allege and prove that the death of her husband
was caused accidentally. She offered as her witness the person who shot her husband
and was bound by this testimony because the testimony was uncontradicted and the
witness was not impeached. The Johnson. decision has been received with mixed feel-
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opinion by Judge Goodrich is particularly noteworthy in that it places
almost complete reliance upon modern text authorities who would abolish
both the rule that a party is bound by the testimony of his witnesses and
the prohibition against impeaching one's own witnesses."' Whether
called by plaintiff or defendant, witnesses are in court for the sole pur-
pose of revealing the truth, and rules of evidence which restrict and dis-
tort this purpose should be rejected without cavil.5" The Johnson deci-
sion unashamedly records these sentiments.
Impeaching the Adverse Witness
The testimonial qualifications of the adversary's witness are always
open to attack. In the main, credibility may be attacked on cross-
examination or by extrinsic evidence, by proving that the witness has
made statements inconsistent with his present tesitmony, by revealing
bias; interest, or corruption, by alluding to past convictions and misdeeds,
by assailing character directly through the medium of character witnesses.
Restrictive rules, hewn from countless precedents and inflexible legisla-
tive enactments, make ready understanding of the impeachment process
virtually impossible.
If prior statements of the witness are to be admitted for impeach-
ment purposes, it is axiomatic that real inconsistency exist between the
two assertions of the witness. 6 No assumptions are made as to the fal-
sity of present testimony or the truth of prior statements, as the triers
of fact are free to reject both versions. 7 Cases are not in agreement as
to the degree of inconsistency required. A strict line of authorities would
require that there be contradiction in plain terms between testimonial as-
sertions and previous statements made."8 These authorities overlook the
ings. See Notes, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 675 (1954), 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 646 (1954), 1954
WASH. U.L.Q. 348.
54. MAGuIRE, EvIDENcE-CommoN SENSE AND Commaox LAW 43 (lst ed. 1947);
MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 64 (1954); 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 896-99
(3d ed. 1940). Ladd, Impeachment of One's Ozm Witness-New Develotnnents, 4 U.
CHI. L. REv. 69, 96 (1936).
55. UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 20 abolishes the prohibitory rule in plain, un-
equivocal language: "Subject to Rules 21 and 22, for the purpose of impairing or sup-
porting the credibility of a witness, any party including the party calling him may ex-
amine him and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him and any
other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility." Rules 21 and 22 set limitations
upon the types of impeaching evidence that may be offered. Rules 20 and 22 state in
separate provisions the substance of MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106 (1942).
56. Denver City Tramway Co. v. Lomovt, 53 Colo. 292, 126 Pac. 276 (1912); 3
WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1040 (3d ed. 1940).
57. 3 WiGomRE, EVIDENCE § 1017 (3d ed. 1940).
58. "Before evidence of an impeaching character can be considered as competent,
it must appear that such evidence is contradictory of what the witness states at the
trial, and such evidence must appear after the evidence is construed most favorably to
the witness sought to be impeached. . . ." Sanger v. Bacon, 180 Ind. 322, 328, 101
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fact that the existence or non-existence of contradiction is largely a mat-
ter of degree, hence inferences of consistency might be found in many
instances. If material variance between testimonial assertions and prior
statements does exist, it seems fitting to allow comparisons, contradic-
tions notwithstanding. 9
When counsel attempts to discredit the adverse witness by proving
contradictory statements, sound trial tactics will generally require that
adequate warning be given on cross-examination. The trial judge
should be endowed with discretion to exclude extrinsic evidence of prior
contradictory statements unless the witness, on cross-examination, has
been given an opportunity to admit or deny making the extra-judicial
assertions. In this manner, the witness is given fair warning that the
statements may be offered against him, and if an admission is forthcom-
ing, extrinsic proof will be unnecessary."0 On the other hand it is un-
fortunate that this sound rule of practice should be treated as an article
of faith which necessitates observance in every instance. A great ma-
jority of jurisdictions have accomplished just that by requiring founda-
tion testimony as a condition precedent to impeachment by extrinsic evi-
dence."' The rule apparently made its debut in Queen Caroline's Case,2
N.E. 1001, 1003 (1913). See also Gackstetter v. Market St. Ry., 59 Cal. App. Dec.
1068, 280 Pac. 154 (1929), 104 Cal. App. 89, 285 Pac. 409 (1930) (impeaching testimony
must be plainly inconsistent with that already given); Seller v. Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430
(1884) (contradiction required but degree of contradiction does not effect competency);
State v. Chickering, 97 N.H. 368, 89 A.2d 206 (1952) (contradiction required).
59. Commonwealth v. West, 312 Mass. 438, 45 N.E.2d 260 (1942) (contradiction
in plain terms not necessary; enough if testimony taken as a whole indicates a differ-
ence); O'Neill v. Minneapolis Street Ry., 213 Minn. 514, 7 N.W.2d 665 (1942) (state-
ment should be received if there is a variance, degree of inconsistency not considered) ;
Kesten v. Forbes, 273 App. Div. 646, 78 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1948) (prior statements admis-
sible when tending to prove differing facts; direct, positive contradiction not necessary).
60. McCoR26IcK, EVIDENcE § 37 (1954); 3 WIGmolE, EVIDENCE § 1025 (3d ed.
1940) ; Hale, Imtpeachment of Witnesses by Prior Inconsistent Statements, 10 So. CAL.
L. REv. 135 (1937) ; Ladd, Witnesses, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 523 (1956) ; Spiegelberg, The
Warning Question, 6 N.Y.U.L. REV. 397 (1929).
61. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Conrad v. Grif fey, 16 How.
38 (1853); United States v. Indian Trailer Corp., 226 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1955);
Brower v. State, 236 Ind. 35, 138 N.E.2d 237 (1956) ; Roller v. Kling, 150 Ind. 159, 49
N.E. 948 (1898) ; State v. Aguirre, 167 Kan. 266, 206 P.2d 118 (1949) ; State v. Laspy,
298 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. 1957). There are a few states which impose no such condition.
"Indeed, the utility of such a practice is not very obvious. Witnesses about to be im-
peached are generally persons of a doubtful or unknown character; and the wisdom of
putting them on their guard . . . is not very discernible." Tucker v. Welsh, 17 Mass.
160, 166 (1821). See also State v. Chickering, 97 N.H. 368, 89 A.2d 206 (1952). How-
ever, the Massachusetts statute, permitting limited impeachment of one's own witness,
does require the laying of a foundation. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 233, § 23 (1956). An
intermediate and workable solution leaves enforcement or remission of the foundation
rule to the discretion of the trial judge. Giles v. Valentic, 355 Pa. 108, 49 A.2d 384
(1946). MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106(2) (1942) and UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE:
22(b) adopt the compromise position permitting the judge to exclude extrinsic evi-
dence at his discretion.
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decided early in the nineteenth century, and it seems quite evident that
prior practice recognized no such requirement. Granted, the requirement
does t~nd to reduce confusion to a minimum by eliminating unnecessary
impeachments, but absolute insistence upon adherence in every case may
work undeniable hardship. In many cases it will be impossible to lay a
foundation while the witness is on the stand, because prior contradic-
tions may not be apparent at that juncture. If the witness should die or
be otherwise unavailable, there would no longer be opportunity for pre-
senting the facts as they were previously represented. 3
Another lingering by-product of Queen's Case complicates the task
of laying a proper foundation. The English precedent required counsel,
before examining a witness about the terms of a document, to produce
the document in question. It inhibited counsel from effectively testing
the witness because it gave the witness the decided advantage of inform-
ing himself as to the contents of the statement prior to being questioned
and therefore limited the effectiveness of the statement as a truth-testing
device. 4 With the general revision of common law procedure in 1854,
the rule was abolished by legislation in England, 5 but it has received
wavering allegiance in several American jurisdictions."8 Despite wither-
ing criticism, the rule has survived in some quarters, notably with refer-
ence to depositions and reported testimony."
62. 2 Brod. & B. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (H.L. 1820).
63. Majority decisions, following the strict foundation rule, often recognize that
hardship may exist in unusual situations, yet disallow exceptions on the theory that re-
laxation of the rule in such cases would offer temptation to perjury and fabrication of
testimony. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). The strict rule has been
held inapplicable where inconsistent statements were made subsequent to preliminary
hearing; and- where- witness- was unavailable at trial. People v. Collup, 27 Cal. 2d 829,
167 P.2d 714 (1946) ; Note, 20 So. CAL. L. REV. 102 (1946).
64. 4 WiGfoE, EVIDENCE § 1259 (3d ed. 1940).
65. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, § 24 (1854) (providing that witness may be cross-
examined as to previous statements made in writing without writing being shown in
advance).
66. Kennedy v. State, 240 Ala. 89, 196 So. 884 (1940) ; Meadors v. Commonwealth,
281 Ky. 622, 136 S.W.2d 1066 (1940) ; Gaffney v. People, 50 N.Y. 423 (1872) ; Kesten
v. Forbes, 273 App. Div. 646, 78 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1948).
67. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp. v. Lewis, 326 Ill. App. 84, 61 N.E.2d 290 (1942)
(deposition must be shown to witness) ; Cooper v. Hoeglund, 221 Minn. 446, 22 N.W.2d
450 (1946) (transcript need not be shown). Other jurisdictions have consistently ruled
that it is not necessary to confront the witness with a written statement prior to ques-
tioning. United States v. Dilliard, 101 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1938) (a clear opinion by
L. Hand, J.) ; People v. Young, 70 Cal. App. 2d 28, 160 P.2d 132 (1945) ; Martin v.
Hoffman, 77 Kan. 185, 93 Pac. 625 (1908) ; Wassmer v. Public Service Electric & Gas
Co., 122 NJ.L. 367, 5 A.2d 762, 122 N.J.L. 375, 5 A.2d 794 (1939). UNIFORm RULE OF
EVIDENCE 22 (a) provides that it shall not be necessary to show or to read to the wit-
ness any part of the writing though the judge may require that counsel indicate the time
and place of the writing and the name of the person addressed.
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When the proper foundation has been laid and the witness clearly
denies having made the statement in question, impeachment is in order.
Yet, if the witness merely states that he does not remember or does not
recall, question may be raised as to whether self-contradiction actually
exists. Early judicial opinions were inclined to quibble, thereby restrict-
ing impeachment by extrinsic evidence unless witness response was un-
equivocal,"s though modern authorities almost invariably permit impeach-
ment where the witness does not clearly admit having made the state-
ments."9
Counsel will frequently be permitted to cross-examine witnesses
with regard to matters wholly immaterial to the issues in the case when
cross-examination is aimed at testing credibility."0 Thus a witness may
be interrogated concerning his past indiscretions, his convictions of crimi-
nal offenses and his inadequacies, regardless of the fact that information
elicited has no probative value except for its bearing upon credibility
factors. On the other hand, extrinsic evidence relative to prior -incon-
sistent statements is almost invariably rejected unless it concerns facts
relevant to material issues in the case. Contradiction, therefore, at least
as it refers to extrinsic proof, is forbidden on collateral matters.7'
The term collateral is as ambiguous as it is overworked and furnishes
no real test. In essence it means that the matter inquired about is not
logically relevant, independently of pure impeachment, or else so remote
that it should not be inquired into through the medium of contradictory
extrinsic testimony. Many tests have been proposed in many precedents,"'
but none has endured so satisfactorily as the test laid down more than
a century ago in Attorney General v. Hitchcock!' As Dean Wigmore
68. Wiggins v. Holman, 5 Ind. 502 (1854); Robinson v. Pitzer, 3 W. Va. 335(1869).
69. Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S.
776 (1943) ; State v. Perkins, 343 Mo. 560, 116 S.W.2d 468 (1938) ; McGehee v. Per-
kins, 188 Va. 116, 49 S.E.2d 304 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1727 (Bums 1946) ; Note,
2 VAND. L. REV. 317 (1949).
70. State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229 (1936).
71. Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Pollard v. State, 229
Ind. 62, 94 N.E.2d 912 (1950) ; Miller v. State, 174 Ind. 255, 91 N.E. 930 (1910) ; State
v. Swartz, 87 Kan. 852, 126 Pac. 1091 (1912) ; State v. Rocco, 222 La. 177, 62 So. 2d
265 (1952); Ambrozi v. Fry, 158 Neb. -18, 62 N.W.2d 259 (1954); McCoRMICK, EvI-
DENCE § 36 (1954); 3 WIGAORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1000-1006, 1020-1023 (3d ed. 1940).
72. Many precedents have approved a narrow test which would permit impeaching
proof provided the cross-examiner was entitled to prove facts adduced as part of his
case, tending to establish his plea. Staser v. Hogan, 120 Ind. 220, 21 N.E. 911, 22
N.E. 990 (1889). In reality it is not merely matters part of the case that may be sub-ject to cross-examination, but any matter which would have been otherwise admissible
in evidence. Literal application of the narrow test would exclude evidence of bias, in-
terest and the like which are neither collateral nor matters "part of the case."
73. 1 Exch. 91 (1847). This decision has been well received by authorities in the
field, but subsequent judicial decisions by no means reflect unanimous acceptance. The
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has so ably phrased it, the test reads: "Could the fact, as to which error
is predicated, have been shown in evidence for any purpose independently
of the contradiction ?"4
Applying the foregoing test, two classes of facts would be admissible
independently of self contradiction: (1) facts relevant to matters at is-
sue; (2) facts admissible to discredit the witness by showing motive,
bias, interest, or any other similar matter likely to affect his testimony.
Bias, state of mind and feelings of a witness are not collateral factors,
and bias or like emotions may be shown by extrajudicial statements of
the witness from which an inference as to his feelings may be drawn.
In pointing up bias, counsel would thus be allowed to contradict the pri-
mary witness by attempting to extract admissions on cross-examination
or by offering extrinsic evidence independently of cross-examination. 5
Though the rule is clear that a witness' testimony regarding collateral
matters may not be refuted by the calling of other witnesses and the pro-
duction of extrinsic evidence, there should be no prohibition against
examining the witness further himself on the chance that he may change
his answer. This proposition was declared most forcefully in a recent
New York decision, People v. Sorge,6 where the defendant in a criminal
case denied committing a specific crime. The district attorney was per-
mitted to continue his cross-examination, provided of course that he
acted in good faith, in the hope that he might induce the witness to aban-
'don his negative answers. The Court of Appeals most unambiguously
pointed out that a negative response will not fob off further interrogation
of the primary witness, further asserting that a contrary ruling would
following cases apply the rule without question: Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633
(D.C. Cir. 1942) ; State v. Sweeney, 75 Kan. 265, 88 Pac. 1078 (1907) ; Coles v. Harsch,
129 Ore. 11, 276 Pac. 248 (1929). See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1020, 1021 (3d ed.
1940).
74. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1020.
75. Mims v. United States, 254 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Ewing v. United States,
135 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Bryant v. State, 233 Ind. 274, 118 N.E.2d 894 (1954) ;
Blum v. State, 196 Ind. 675, 148 N.E. 193 (1925) ; State v. Elijah, 206 Minn. 619, 289
N.W. 575 (1940); Kincheloe v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 414, 175 S.W.2d 593 (1943).
When primary witness denies revengeful feelings, it has been held that extrinsic evi-
dence may be given that he made such assertions of revengeful nature. Johnson v. Grie-
penstrob, 150 Neb. 126, 33 N.W.2d 549 (1948). If bias, interest, or corruption is evi-
denced by utterances, the weight of authority requires that the witness be asked about
the utterance on cross-examination; otherwise the extrinsic evidence will face rejection
for lack of proper foundation. Davis v. Ivey, 93 Fla. 387, 112 So. 264 (1927) ; State v.
Harmon, 21 Wash. 2d 581, 152 P.2d 314 (1944). Contra, Kidd v. People, 97 Colo. 480,
51 P.2d 1020 (1935). See generally Annots., 74 A.L.R. 1157 (1931); 16 A.L.R. 984
(1922).
76. 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950). See also Bates v. Chilton County, 244
Ala. 297, 13 So. 2d 186 (1943) ; Dane v. MacGregor, 94 N.H. 294, 52 A.2d 290 (1947) ;
People v. McCormick, 303 N.Y. 403, 103 N.E.2d 529 (1952); 3 WXmoRE, EVIDENCE §
1023 (3d ed. 1940).
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grant the witness power to render most cross-examination a futile ex-
ercise. Contrary decisions have obtained in a few jurisdictions, based in
main on the very false premise that a witness may never be contradicted
with regard to matters collateral."' In principle these decisions are at
war with common sense and should be rejected.
The fact that a prior statement might happen to be in the form of
an opinion should be incidental to a sound policy of admissibility, yet
hyper-critical judicial minds have succeeded in weaving a blanket rule of
exclusion that would prohibit any reference to statements of opinion."'
What is supposed to be a difference in kind between fact and opinion is
at most a difference in degree only, and a true test of admissibility
should rest upon one factor-inconsistency." If a statement is incon-
sistent with present testimony, be it opinion or fact, the jury should be
allowed to consider it in weighing the veracity of the witness and the
accuracy of his testimony. A prior opinion may have little bearing upon
the accuracy of facts testified to, or it may disclose glaring inconsis-
tencies; admission or exclusion should rest upon this criterion and none
other."0
Character Factors and Impeachment
Witness character may be attacked: (1) by evidence of past crimes
and misconduct, offered during cross-examination; (2) by records of
past convictions; (3) by bad reputation evidence offered through charac-
ter witnesses; (4) through cross-examination of a witness who has testi-
fied as to good character. In any one of these situations, the character
or reputation of the adverse witness is brought to focus- in some juris-
dictions reasonable protection against character assassination is af-
forded-in others, the mercy of God alone prevails.
77. Arine v. United States, 10 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Starke v. State, 49 Fla.
41, 37 So. 850 (1905).
78. Welch v. State, 104 Ind. 349 (1885) (follows strict rule of exclusion) ; Ford v.
Dahl, 360 Mo. 437, 228 S.W.2d 800 (1950) (Missouri has always rejected statements
in form of opinion, no excuses offered) ; State v. Thompson, 71 S.D. 319, 24 N.W.2d
10 (1946) (predicated upon mythical danger of jury misusing opinion assertions) ; Webb
v. City of Seattle, 22 Wash. 2d 596, 157 P.2d 312 (1945) (quoting from 40 Cyc. 2712
to effect that expressions of opinions should be excluded, Wigmore not figuring among
citations of authority).
79. McCOR ,IcK, EVIDENCE § 35 (1954); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1041 (3d ed.
1940) ; Grady, The Admissibility of a Prior Statement of Opinion for Purposes of Ihn-
peachment, 41 CORNxL L.Q. 224 (1956).
80. A majority of jurisdictions have in varying degrees accepted this position. At-
lantic Greyhound Corporation v. Eddins, 177 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1949); Crowley v. Dix,
136 Conn. 97, 68 A.2d 366 (1949); Leinbach v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 135 Kan.
40, 10 P.2d 33 (1932); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 281 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1955); 296
S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1956); Wolfe v. Madison Ave. Coach Co., 171 Misc. 707, 13 N.Y.S.2d
741 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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The extent to which instances of an evil past may be evidenced is
not clear. To begin with, distinction must be made between evidencing
past dishonorable conduct and past convictions, and reported decisions
have not always drawn distinctions with clarity. Effort should also be
made to dissipate the confusion surrounding the admission of extrinsic
bad reputation evidence, offered to indicate that the witness is not
worthy of belief. In this latter instance, spific conduct evidence is not
appropriate, and courts have at times unwittingly superimposed the re-
strictive requirements peculiar to this type of impeachment upon tech-
niques for cross-examination. A certain amount of disagreement among
jurisdictions may well be anticipated, but consistent lack of agreement
within an isolated jurisdiction can be disarming.
In England, cross-examining counsel may probe extensively into
the past of the adverse witness by interrogating with respect to specific
instances of crime and other dishonorable conduct.8 Since it is well
established, in England and America, that cross-examination to impeach
credibility is not restricted to the scope of the subject matter testified
to on direct examination, an abundance of evil may be portrayed to the
jury under the guise of questioning credibility.82  The extent to which
examination may be carried appears to rest within the discretion of
counsel himself, and whatever is relevant to character may be brought
to light.
In the majority of American jurisdictions, the extent of examination
in this regard will be determined by the trial judge.83 One might expect
judicial temperament to restrict inquiry to the incidence of other crimes
and misconduct which reflect lack of veracity, but a survey of case
authorities reveals that judicial wisdom has not always drawn so fine a
line. 4 Certain courts have attempted to restrict the content of cross-
81. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 983 (3d ed. 1940). On the other hand it has long
been settled in all Anglo-American jurisdictions that extrinsic evidence of bad conduct
is inadmissible.
82. Dickey v. Wagoner, 160 Kan. 216, 160 P.2d 698 (1945); Beck v. Hood, 185
Pa. 32, 39 Atl. 842 (1898).
83. Lavengood v. Lavengood, 225 Ind. 206, 73 N.E.2d 685 (1947); Niemeyer v.
McCarty, 221 Ind. 688, 51 N.E.2d 365 (1943) ; People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d
637 (1950) ; State v. Neal, 222 N.C. 546, 23 S.E.2d 911 (1943).
84. A Kansas opinion, State v. Roselli, 109 Kan. 33, 198 Pac. 195 (1921), presents
an extreme example of liberality. The accused, charged with first degree murder, was
asked on cross-examination if he had not sold cocaine, whether he had not acted as a
fence, been confined to a reformatory and broken parole violations. Searching ex-
amination was made respecting his association with criminals of the beating, killing
type. Questions were posed concerning the dubious morality of his girl friend Mabel,
all in the interest of testing credibility.
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examination to matters pertaining to veracity traits.8 5 A sizeable block of
federal decisions has denied reference to specific acts of misconduct on
cross-examination, which have not resulted in conviction for a felony
or crime of moral turpitude.8 6 Questions which degrade or disgrace
have been forbidden in other jurisdictions.8 7 Inquiry into past conduct
has also been curtailed by rulings requiring that acts referred to be re-
cent in the sense that they bear definite relation to present character.88  A
select minority of jurisdictions has prohibited any inquiry with regard
to acts of misconduct, thus forcing the trial judge to surrender any
discretion he might have had pertaining to the limits of cross-
examination. 9
When the accused in a criminal case takes the witness stand he abdi-
cates his protected station as a party and assumes the more vulnerable
role of witness. Like any other witness, he may now be subject to rigid
cross-examination aimed at impugning his credibility, and the ugliness
of an unfortunate past will be bared." This concept of liberal impeach-
ment most certainly clashes with a much revered principle of Anglo-
American law which proclaims that evidence of a collateral offense
shall not be received as substantive evidence of the crime for which a
defendant is being tried.9 Is there anyone so naive who would maintain
85. Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694
(1941) ; Coulston v. United States, 51 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1931) ; State v. Schutte, 97
Conn. 462, 117 Atl. 508 (1922). A recent federal decision, United States v. Provoo, 215
F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1954), appears to restrict cross-examination re conduct to facts relat-
ing to witness veracity. Comment, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 209.
86. Abdul v. United States, 254 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Echert v. United States,
188 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1951); United States v. Klass, 166 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1948).
But see, Barnard v. Wabash R.R., 208 F.2d 489 (8th Cir. 1953).
87. This protective policy, once popular, has suffered for lack of adherents in a
latter day, though isolated statutes have perpetuated the moral force of the rule. IOWA
CODE § 622.14 (1954): "When the matter sought to be elicited would tend to render
the witness criminally liable, or to expose him to public ignominy, he is not compelled
to answer, except as otherwise provided." See 3 WIGORE, EVIDENCE §§ 984, 986(3)
(3d ed. 1940).
88. State v. Dillman, 183 Iowa 1147, 168 N.W. 204 (1918).
89. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 2051 (Deering 1953), provides that a witness may not
be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts, though it may be shown that he
has been convicted of a felony. In Pennsylvania, one charged with crime is not required
to answer any question tending to show that he has committed crime, with two excep-
tions noted in the statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1930). See also Myers v.
State, 149 Tex. Crim. 301, 194 S.W.2d 91 (1946). Dean Wigmore would limit acts in-
quired into to those relating to veracity, regardless of whether conviction had resulted.
3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 982 (3d ed. 1940). UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 22(d) pro-
vides that "evidence of specific instances of his [witness'] conduct relevant only as
tending to prove a trait of his character shall be inadmissible."
90. Metzger v. State, 214 Ind. 113, 13 N.E.2d 519 (1938).
91. A general rule of exclusion provides that on prosecution for a particular crime,
evidence which tends to show that the accused has committed another crime, wholly in-
dependent of and unconnected with that for which he is on trial, is irrelevant and in-
admissible. See generally Slough, Relevancy Unraveled, 6 KAN. L. REv. 38, 45 (1957) ;
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that juries are endowed with superior powers of sifting impeachment
evidence from substantive evidence? One may consciously accept im-
peachment evidence for what it is worth, but the barbs of prejudice pos-
sess an uncanny faculty for impressing the unconscious self. Warning
judicial instructions may carefully distinguish the uses to which particu-
lar items of proof may be put, yet it is highly improbable that cold, judi-
cial analysis will temper or control the juror's very human propensity to
take all things into account. If credibility be the object of attack, coun-
sel might cross-examine the accused with respect to misconduct indicat-
ing a lack of veracity, however propriety dictates that examination in the
name of impeachment cease at this juncture. Incidents of assaultive be-
havior, appetites for strong drink, and penchants for immorality invite
scorn and censure among the moral kind, but they cast little light upon
a Witness' inclinations to distort the truth.
All American jurisdictions, either by statute or decision permit evi-
dence of convictions to be introduced to affect credibility, though there is
no agreement as to the type of conviction that will be received. One
formula adheres to common law terminology and requires the conviction
to have been for an "infamous crime." 2  Another formula limits scope
of examination to conviction for "felonies" or "crimen falsi."93 A third
formula admits evidence of conviction for "felony" or "crime involving
moral turpitude."9  Finally, there are jurisdictions that allow evidence
of conviction to enter without limitation, meaning that conviction of any
crime will satisfy.9 5 There is an increasing tendency to bar reference to
traffic court convictions, and a declaration of delinquency in juvenile
court will not ordinarily be classified with conviction for purposes of
impeachment."
Notes, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 131 (1947), 25 IND. L.J. 64 (1949), 37 MINN. L. PEv. 608
(1953).
92. State v. English, 132 Conn. 573, 46 A.2d 121 (1946).
93. Commonwealth v. Kostan, 349 Pa. 560, 37 A.2d 606 (1944). "Crimen falsi" is
a general designation of a class of offenses including those which involve deceit or
falsification or affect the public administration of justice. Forgery, counterfeiting, and
perjury are common examples.
94. A recent decision in Maine defines moral turpitude as being akin to baseness,
vileness, or depravity. Thus driving while intoxicated was considered utterly base,
whereas driving under the influence was not relegated to such a damning category.
State v. Jenness, 143 Me. 380, 62 A.2d 867 (1948).
95. Way v. State, 224 Ind. 280, 66 N.E.2d 608 (1946) (convictions for speeding
and disorderly conduct allowed despite slight probative values; discretion of lower court
stressed) ; Fritch v. State, 199 Ind. 89, 155 N.E. 257 (1927) (cross-examination not
confined to convictions for felony or infamous crimes) ; State v. Osburn, 171 Kan. 330,
232 P.2d 451 (1951) ; Coslow v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 378, 177 P.2d 518 (1947). See
Annot., 161 A.L.R. 233 (1946).
96. Woodley v. State, 227 Ind. 407, 86 N.E.2d 529 (1949) (cross-examination
concerning juvenile charge held improper). Evidence of dishonorable discharge from
army has likewise been excluded. Kelley v. State, 226 Ind. 148, 78 N.E.2d 547 (1948).
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Assuming that a record of conviction is admissible to impugn credi-
bility, will something less than conviction, for example arrest or indict-
ment, be admissible? The answer should be unqualifiedly negative, and
a decisive majority of jurisdictions are in accord with the premise that
arrest and indictment are not sufficiently relevant to the task of charac-
ter dissection.9" On principle it would seem that evidence of conviction
should be limited to those crimes which indicate a specific readiness to
falsify. Conviction on a charge of murder or rape will not necessarily
imply a disposition to lie or fabricate. Dean Ladd has suggested as a
partial solution the elimination of proof of crimes having no relationship
to dishonesty or false statement.98 It is interesting to observe that the
Model Code and Uniform Rules have since accepted his suggestions
without hint of dissent.99
One of the most firmly established rules of Anglo-American law is
that which prohibits the prosecution from offering evidence of the de-
fendant's bad character until the defendant has offered proof of his own
good character. In proving the character of the defendant, particular
acts of misconduct are inadmissible for policy reasons. This absolute
blackout pertaining to evidence of specific instances of misconduct does
not carry over to problems involved in the cross-examination of the de-
fendant as a witness, or to problems inherent in cross-examination of a
character witness. Opinion testimony of a witness as to the character of
the accused is likewise excluded in a majority of jurisdictions."'
The reputation of the defendant as a party is not vulnerable to at-
tack unless he chooses to enter evidence of his good reputation, but when
97. Petro v. State, 204 Ind. 401, 184 N.E. 710 (1933) ; Wagner v. State, 115 Ohio
St. 136, 152 N.E. 28 (1926); Notes, 9 IND. L.J. 543 (1934), 9 W. REs. L. REV. 218
(1958). A dwindling minority permit reference to arrest and indictment. State v. Big-
ler, 138 Kan. 13, 23 P.2d 598 (1933).
98. Ladd, Crcdibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 190 (1940).
99. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106(1) (b) (1942) bars extrinsic evidence of
convictions "not involving dishonesty or false statements." For all practical purposes,
the wording of UNIFOR.S RULE OF EVIDENCE 21 is identical. Rule 21 plainly provides
that evidence of conviction shall be inadmissible against a defendant-witness unless he
has first introduced evidence solely for the purpose of supporting his credibility. In a
few jurisdictions, the accused may not be cross-examined as to the fact of former con-
victions, and prior convictions can only be shown by introducing record of conviction.
People v. Halkens, 386 II. 167, 53 N.E.2d 923 (1944); Commonwealth v. Danton, 243
Mass. 552, 137 N.E. 652 (1923).
100. A minority of jurisdictions still cling to the traditional practice of permitting
character witnesses to state their opinions, based largely on the premise that witnesses
possess sufficient knowledge derived from observation of the defendant's conduct. State
v. Ferguson, 222 Iowa 1148, 270 N.W. 874 (1937) ; Sabo v. State, 119 Ohio St. 231, 163
N.E. 28 (1928). Dean Wigmore infers that the modern reputation requirement is a by-
product of heresy. 7 WIG ORE, EVIDENCE § 1981 (3d ed. 1940). MODEL CODE OF Evi-
DENCE rule 306(2) (1942) and UNiFoR mi RULE OF EVIDENCE 47 permit use of opinion
evidence as well as reputation evidence in proving the character of the accused.
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he assumes the role of witness he falls heir to the tribulations of other
witnesses.' As was true when evidencing party-character, the great
majority of courts require that witness-character be proved by reputation,
good or bad."0 2 Thus it is not permissible to establish reputation for
truth and veracity by extrinsic evidence of particular acts, the object of
this rule being to avoid unfair surprise, undue consumption of time, con-
fusion of issues, and prejudice. 3 Personal opinion of the character
witness will be excluded, because permitting evidence of opinion from
observation would likely provoke distracting side issues.' 4 That these
dangers do exist is undeniable, but they are also present during cross-
examination of a witness who testifies as to reputation; and in the long
run, control by the trial judge should suffice to ameliorate an uncomely
situation. Leading text writers in this country are opposed to the ma-
jority trend and would favor the use of opinion testimony except in those
situations where sound judicial discretion would dictate otherwise."'
Even jurisdictions which sanction the use of opinion evidence in proving
party-character00 are known to disapprove of it when evidencing witness-
character.' Hence character, as it relates to credibility, cannot be proved
by opinion or knowledge of the character witness. The Uniform Rules
of Evidence, on the other hand, in no sense create any obstacles to opinion
testimony, and as long as veracity traits are relevant, qualified opinion
evidence is receivable for impeachment purposes.0 8
101. Witness-character may be attacked from the beginning. In fact, a witness
may not enjoy the luxury of good reputation evidence offered in his behalf until his
reputation has been attacked by the adverse party. When the defendant testifies as a
witness his reputation for truth and veracity may be assailed despite the fact that he has
not offered evidence of his good reputation. There are, however, scattered areas of
dissent. In State v. Branch, 66 Idaho 528, 164 P.2d 182 (1945), the Supreme Court of
Idaho ruled that testimony concerning defendant's reputation for truth, honesty, and
integrity in the community was improper without defendant first putting his reputation
therefor in issue. The majority opinion is painfully technical but presents an elaborate
review of statutes and cases in point.
102. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 920-30 (3d ed. 1940) ; 7 id. § 1985.
103. Foreman v. State, 203 Ind. 571, 180 N.E. 291 (1932); Griffith v. State, 140
Ind. 163, 39 N.E. 440 (1895).
104. Sisson v. State, 168 Ark. 1005, 272 S.W. 674 (1925) ; Gifford v. People, 148
Ill. 173, 35 N.E. 754 (1893) ; State v. Johnson, 40 Kan. 266 (1888). In modern Eng-
lish practice, the rule of exclusion announced in Regina v. Rowton, 10 Cox Cr. Rep. 25
(1865), has apparently been disregarded when evidencing witness-character. Thus in
England today, the orthodox practice sanctioning use of personal opinion testimony still
prevails, Anerican authorities to the contrary.
105. McCoRmIcx, EVIDENCE § 44 (1954) ; 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1985, 1986 (3d
ed. 1940). Ladd, Techniques of Character Testimony, 24 IowA L. REV. 498, 499, 512
(1939).
106. See citations note 100 supra.
107. State v. Ferguson, 222 Iowa 1148, 270 N.W. 874 (1937) ; State v. Caveness, 78
N.C. 486 (1878) ; Bucklin v. State, 20 Ohio 18 (1851).
108. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 20, 21.
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Perhaps out of recognition of the weakness of bland reputation
evidence, or perhaps out of an innate desire to preserve some aura of
practicality, a majority of decisions have relented and will permit quali-
fied use of opinion testimony. After a character witness -has declared
as a fact that the witness' reputation is good or bad, the following ques-
tion may be put: "From your knowledge of that reputation, would you
believe him upon oath?"1'D Apparently courts have compromised upon
this hybrid form of interrogation because it merely emphasizes the
general tesitmony of the impeaching witness and does not stress personal
evaluation. In thoery, then, the inquiry as to personal belief is based
upon knowledge acquired from reputation and not upon personal dealings
or personal acquaintance of the impeaching witness with the witness as-
sailed. This curious interlarding of wishful thinking and devotion to
stereotype only serves to emphasize the weakness of a type of legal mind
that becomes infatuated with the sound of a rule without really knowing
why. Ideally, the law of evidence should reflect the warp and woof of
human values, but technical rules of this order simply perpetuate a pseudo-
professional brand of casuistry.
Now that it is agreed that a character witness may impeach the
primary witness by reference to general reputation, an additional question
arises: What type of reputation? It appears only logical that a character
witness should restrict his testimony to reputation for truth and veracity,
nevertheless decisions are in conflict as to whether inquiry should be
limited to reputation for truthfulness and like traits or whether general
moral character may be shown.1 '
A substantial majority of jurisdictions have limited inquiry to repu-
tation for truth and veracity."' A dwindling minority will admit evi-
dence of general moral character, either by statute or decision." 2 Further-
109. Burke v. Zwick, 299 IIl. App. 558, 20 N.E.2d 912 (1939) ; State v. Hooker, 99
Wash. 661, 170 Pac. 374 (1918).
110. This conflict of authority is ably discussed in Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current
Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 172 (1940).
111. Pandula v. Fonseca, 145 Fla. 395, 199 So. 358 (1941) ; Taylor v. Clendening,
4 Kan. 524 (1868); Chatham v. State, 65 Okla. Crim. 240, 84 P.2d 804 (1938); State
v. Ternan, 32 Wash. 2d 584, 203 P.2d 342 (1949). This mild approach appears out of
phase with rulings permitting the ultimate of defendant torture on cross-examination.
3 WIGuaoRE, EViDENcE § 923 (3d ed. 1940); Slough, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA
L. REv. 325 (1956).
112. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-1724 (Bums 1946), 9-1608 (Burns 1956); IowA CODE
§ 622.18 (1954). Grammer v. State, 239 Ala. 633, 196 So. 268 (1940); State v. Guy,
106 La. 8, 30 So. 268 (1901). Missouri for years followed the dictates of the minority
rule permitting evidence of bad reputation for morality to be introduced for purpose of
impeaching credibility. Little more than two decades ago, the supreme court of that
state overruled all previous decisions on the subject and joined hands with the majority,
thus restricting impeachment to truth and veracity. State v. Williams, 337 Mo. 884, 87
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more, almost fanatical emphasis has been placed upon the form of the
question to be put, and even the slightest deviation from norm may supply
grounds for objection, if not reversal."' For example, California, Idaho,
and Utah are linked together in that their statutes limit inquiry to general
reputation of the witness for truth, honesty, or integrity." 4 Many juris-
dictions restrict questioning to general reputation for truth and veracity,
whereas general reputation for truth may be the proper object of inquiry
in other courts."' Judges have even quibbled over the omission of a
single word: thus the phrase "reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity"
may be stricken as highly improper if not preceded by and qualified by
the word "general.""'  This uncompromising reverence of technicality
perforce assumes that jurors will be at once shocked and prejudiced by
departure from precedent, yet a modicum of common sense compels re-
jection of such an assumption. Recourse to picayune distinctions in the
name of justice only serves to demonstrate the foolish sophistication of
the ultra-legal mind.
When the character witness has disclosed his general information,
void of opinion and specific familiarity, he will, of course be subject to
searching cross-examination. Once again the rules of the game permit
excavation into the muck of past misdeeds and vices for purposes of cast-
ing light upon the witness' sources of information. Conventional prac-
tice permits the good reputation witness to be interrogated with respect
to rumors or reports of specific acts imputed to the defendant or wit-
ness." 7  This evidence is admitted, not to establish the truth of such re-
ports or rumors, but to test the credibility of the character witness him-
self. The jury should be instructed with regard to proper uses of testi-
S.W.2d 175 (1935). See generally Annots., 100 A.L.R. 1516 (1936); 90 A.L.R. 870
(1934).
113. State v. Branch, 66 Idaho 528, 533, 542, 164 P.2d 182, 184, 188 (1945).
114. State v. Marks, 16 Utah 204, 51 Pac. 1089 (1898).
115. Various jurisdictional rules are discussed in 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 923 (3d
ed. 1940).
116. In State v. Marks, 16 Utah 204, 51 Pac. 1089 (1898), the prosecution called
two witnesses, and they were asked if they knew the defendant's reputation in the com-
munity for truth, honesty, and integrity. The form of inquiry was objected to on ground
that it was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. Approving the basis for this ob-jection, the appellate court ruled that only the general reputation of the defendant-
witness for truth, honesty, and integrity could be called forth, insisting that the word
general was of crucial import. An early Indiana decision similarly held that the word
general preceding character was an essential requisite. Meyncke v. State, 68 Ind. 401
(1879). Moral is that it is important to call witnesses who are acquainted with reputa-
tion generally.
117. Johnson v. State, 260 Ala. 276, 69 So. 2d 854 (1954); Woods v. State, 233
Ind. 320, 119 N.E.2d 558 (1954) ; Jordan v. State, 232 Ind. 265, 110 N.E.2d 751 (1953) ;
State v. Zakoura, 145 Kan. 804, 68 P.2d 11 (1937). See generally MCCORAIICK, EVI-
DENcE § 158 (1954); 3 WGMORE, EVIDENCE § 988 (3d ed. 1940); Annots., 47 A.L.R.2d
1258 (1956) ; 71 A.L.R. 1504 (1931).
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mony elicited; however there is strong reason to believe that harm will
result in any event despite the formal persuasion of judicial counseling.
To remain within technical limits set by propriety and copious prece-
dent, the cross-examiner must fashion his inquiry in a very special man-
ner. He must not frame his question in such a manner as to insinuate
guilt, particularly where evidence in the record of prior misdeeds is non-
existent.118 Since the purpose of cross-examination in detail is to ascer-
tain the general talk of people about the defendant or primary witness;
rather than the witness' own knowledge of these details, the form of in-
quiry, "Have you heard ?" meets with general approval."9 If the examiner
asks, "Do you know?" he courts objection in most jurisdictions. 2 ° For
fear that the witness may testify as to fact, he may not be cross-examined
as to his knowledge of particular acts of misconduct. On the opposite
side of the ledger, during cross-examination of a witness who has testi-
fied as to bad reputation, the examiner cannot call attention to specific
good deeds performed by the primary witness. Reasons for this restric-
tive principle are obvious because even the worst among us have per-
formed certain works of mercy.
Courts are in general agreement that propounding of questions in
bad faith may be ground for reversal,' 2 ' yet establishing bad faith is no
easy matter. The task of curbing the unethical cross-examiner lies with-
in the province of the trial judge, and the judge will not always be cog-
nizant of the source of the examiner's information. Dean McCormick
has suggested that the trial judge be required to request counsel to give
his professional statement to the judge (in the absence of the jury) that
he has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that the acts of
misconduct, imputed by rumor, were actually committed by the accused
or primary witness. 2
118. United States v. Phillips, 217 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1954); State v. Carroll, 188
S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1945).
119. Kasper v. United States, 225 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1955); State v. Steensen, 35
N.J. Super. 103, 113 A.2d 203 (1955). This specific problem was first referred to the
United States Supreme Court in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
Character witnesses were asked if they had heard that Michelson had been convicted
and arrested for different violations. Over objections, the trial court permitted this
interrogation, the Court of Appeals (United States v. Michelson, 165 F.2d 732 (2d Cir.
1948)) and the Supreme Court affirming.
120. Regardless of the prestige of the general rule, there are dissenting voices.
Baehner v. State, 25 Ind. App. 597, 58 N.E. 741 (1900) (character witnesses asked
whether they "knew" of a slot machine in defendant's saloon) ; State v. Cyr, 40 Wash.
2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952) (cross-examination as to "knowledge" proper as long as
it is directed at credibility).
121. People v. Reeves, 128 Cal. App. 2d 410, 275 P.2d 158 (1954) ; Anglin v. State,
92 Okla. Crim. 430, 224 P.2d 272 (1952); Wiley v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 370, 220
S.W.2d 172 (1949).
122. McCoRmicK, EVIDEmcE § 158 (1954).
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Decisions in Illinois and North Carolina have for many years been
at odds with the majority trend. In Illinois, on cross-examination of a
character witness, the witness can be questioned only as to acts of mis-
conduct or charges similar to those for which the accused is being tried. 28
North Carolina decisions have ruled that a character witness may be
cross-examined concerning the general reputation of the defendant as to
particular vices and virtues, but not as to rumors of specific acts of
misconduct." 4
Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Michelson v. United States,2'
championed a restrictive rule-the "fair play" rule-which would place
the same limits upon cross-examination by the prosecution as are placed
upon the defense in direct examination of a character witness. Under
this hypothesis, the entire line of inquiry concerning specific crimes in the
defendant's past would be foreclosed, and the prosecution in effect would
be limited to introducing character witnesses who would testify as to the
"bad reputation" of the defendant and nothing more. On the surface,
this viewpoint appears most humanitarian; however, it should be pointed
out that the prosecution would be completely disarmed if the Rutledge
formula were carried out to the letter. It must be remembered that the
prosecution is not on an equal footing with the defense as far as the
gathering of character evidence is concerned. Limiting the prosecution
to calling adverse witnesses to rebut defense character witnesses would
mean shutting out the prosecution altogether.
Expert Analysis of Credibility
Mr. Justice Jackson delivered a sterling apologia for the status quo
with respect to the law of evidence and proof of reputation when he
wrote:
"[M]uch of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of com-
promises and compensations by which an irrational advantage
to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to
the other. But somehow it has proved a workable even if clumsy
123. People v. Hermens, 5 Ill. 2d 277, 125 N.E.2d 500 (1955) ; People v. Hannon,
381 Ill. 206, 44 N.E2d 923 (1942). Federal courts in Illinois have followed the general
rule approved in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948), discussed in note
119 supra. United States v. Phillips, 217 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1954). judge Jerome Frank,
in writing the opinion for the second circuit, United States v. Michelson, 165 F.2d 732
(2d Cir. 1948), expressed the desire that the United States Supreme Court adopt the
Illinois rule, i.e., that questions are improper unless they relate to offenses similar to
those for which the defendant is being tried.
124. State v. Green, 238 N.C. 257, 77 S.E.2d 614 (1953). But see State v. Church,
229 N.C. 718, 51 S.E.2d 345 (1949) (particular acts ordinarily excluded except where
defendant himself on witness stand admits certain specific acts of his conduct.)
125. 335 U.S. 469, 488 (1948).
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system when moderated by discretionary controls in the hands
of a wise and strong trial court."' 26
However, justification of the status quo should by no means compel
censure of judicial resort to psychiatric examination and other scientific
procedures for testing the veracity of key material witnesses. Certainly
the modern tendency has been one of permitting mentally disordered
witnesses to testify at trial, leaving defects in question to have what-
ever weight they deserve in discrediting powers of observation, recollec-
tion, and communication.127 As competency requirements have relaxed,
the need for psychiatric evaluation of key witness testimony has become
more compelling. Anglo-American lawyers have been too complacent
about accepting the traditional mode of character impeachment as a pana-
cea for evaluating character and credibility factors. Community judg-
ment and scathing cross-examination may indeed uncover the usual flaws
in a witness' observation, recollection, and veracity, but these veracity-
testing devices shed little light upon defective organic capacity or per-
sonality structure. The abnormal witness may appear remarkably lucid
and credible to the average juror, and vigorous cross-examination, far
from uncovering tendencies to distort or confabulate, may only make
the witness and his story more plausible.'28
Of recent date, many have come to agree that scientific evaluation
can be of valuable assistance in manifesting the less recognizable mental
disorders. Psychiatric appraisal of credibility has been recognized as a
very definite aid in exposing hysteria and pathological lying among com-
plaining witnesses of sexual assault.'29  Less than ten years ago, Judge
Goddard, at the second trial of Alger Hiss, held admissible psychiatric
testimony designed to impeach the credibility of government witness
126. Id. at 486.
127. 2 WIG ORE, EVIDENCE § 501 (3d ed. 1940); 3 id. § 931.
128. Cross-examination will rarely expose the psychopathic or pathological liar on
the witness stand. Mental illness is not always manifested in outward changes in de-
meanor or social attitudes, thus deep-seated personality disturbances can often be dis-
cerned only by a trained clinician. HENDERSON & GILLESPIE, A TExTBOOK OF PSYCHIA-
TY 101 (6th ed. 1947); OVERHOLSER & RICHMOND, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 9-10
(1947); Altshuler, The Psychopathology of Lying, 6 J. oF NEUROLOGY AND PSYCHO-
PATHOLOGY 20 (1925) ; Karpman, Lying, 40 J. CRIm. L., C. & P. S. 135 (1949); Note,
Current Med. Sept. 1954, p. 21.
129. 3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 924a (3d ed. 1940); Note, 26 IND. L.J. 98 (1950).
judges have not always welcomed psychiatric diagnoses in discovering defects and dis-
orders likely to impair credibility. Whereas evidence of extreme mental disorder or
illness is generally admissible, courts have frequently rejected expert diagnosis of dis-
orders of lesser moment. This result likely stems from an erroneous assumption that
diagnosis of lesser disorders is based upon inference and speculation. 3 WmoRE, Evi-
DENCE § 932 (3d ed. 1940).
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Whittaker Chambers.' On the basis of a laborious hypothetical ques-
tion, an expert witness arrived at a diagnosis of psychopathic personality
based upon twelve symptoms ranging from repetitive lying to paranoid
thinking and pathological accusations. This ruling evidently marked a
new departure in terms of federal precedent, but as noted by the court,
several decisions in state courts have approved reception of expert
opinion.'31
Though the Hiss case represents a modern innovation in veracity
testing, it also illustrates some of the obvious dangers inherent in reliance
upon scientific appraisal. Dr. Binger, the expert witness, testified that his
opinion was based on personal observation of Mr. Chambers at the first
trial for five days and on one day at the second trial. He had read plays,
poems and articles written by Chambers, but his diagnosis rested largely
on courtroom observation, and his conclusions were extracted through
the medium of a disjointed, onesided hypothetical question. The climate
of the courtroom does not lend itself to proper scientific evaluation of
the personality structure as overt behavior will rarely offer sufficient
basis for accurate diagnosis. 2 If reliable opinion is to be expressed, it
must derive from thorough clinical study and examination. 3  Psychi-
130. United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559, aff'd, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951). Expert testimony re credibility was excluded in the
first trial. N. Y. Times, July 1, 1949, p. 1, col. 2. See, Conrad, Psychiatric Lie Detec-
tion,, 21 F.R.D. 199 (1958); Dession, Freedman, Donnelly and Redlich, Driu-Induced
Revelation and Criminal Iitvestigation, 62 YALE L.J. 315 (1953) ; Notes, 30 NE. L. REv.
513 (1951), 59 YALE L.J. 1324 (1950).
131. People v. Champion, 193 Cal. 441, 225 Pac. 278 (1924) ; Jeffers v. State, 145
Ga. 74, 88 S.E. 571 (1916); State v. Alberts, 199 Iowa 815, 202 N.W. 519 (1925);
Pool v. Day, 143 Kan. 226, 53 P.2d 912 (1936) ; People v. Bastian, 330 Mich. 457, 47
N.W.2d 692 (1951). In Taborsky v. State, 142 Conn. 619, 116 A.2d 433 (1955), a
new trial was granted to a defendant convicted of murder solely on the basis of his
brother's testimony. The brother was subsequently discovered to be insane, the court
noting that this information might be given great weight by the jury in assessing
credibility.
132. In State v. Driver, 88 W. Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921), the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals rejected a court-room diagnosis by a psychiatrist that wit-
ness belonged to a class of morons prone to tell lies. Judge Goddard attempted to dis-
tinguish the Hiss case on grounds that the West Virginia court had not considered psy-
chiatric testimony in 1921 to be sufficiently expert. In reality, it appears that exclusion
in the earlier decision rested largely upon invalidity of technique rather than upon
weakness of psychiatric testimony in general. GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIA-
TRY AND THE LAW ch. 15 (1952). Jones, Admission of Psychiatric Testimony in Alger
Hiss Trial, 11 ALABAMA LAWYER 212 (1950) ; Roche, Truth Telling, Psychiatric Expert
Testimony and the Impeachvent of Witnwsses, 22 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 140 (1951).
133. Attempt was made to apply the Hiss rule in United States v. Rosenberg, 108
F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 200 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
965 (1953). A government witness testified as to a copy of a sketch of a lens mold
drawn from memory. Three psychiatrists expressed their opinions that it was im-
probable that the witness could make the sketch from memory. A science writer stated
that drawing of such sketch from memory was an impossibility. Opinion evidence re-
jected for obvious reasons.
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atric appraisal of witness testimony wil be of undoubted value in cer-
tain demanding test situations, but omnibus methods of truth testing
simply encourage mediocrity at its worst.'
In Lindsey v. United States,' a prosecution for sodomy and statu-
tory rape, the defense introduced in evidence letters and an affidavit of
the prosecuting witness which affectively repudiated her original charges
against the accused. In an effort to rehabilitate their witness' testimony,
the prosecution called a psychiatrist who had given the girl a series of
psychological tests and conducted an interview during which the subject
was under the influence of sodium pentothal."8 ' On appeal, judgment
of conviction was reversed, the Court of Appeals ruling that admission
of statements by a material witness while under the influence of sodium
pentothal constituted prejudicial error, even though not admitted as
substantive evidence but only to rehabilitate the impeached witness' testi-
mony. The court did agree that sodium pentothal and like barbiturates
possessed properties that would release inhibitions and enhance psychi-
atric examination, but would not recognize that tests of this order were
sufficiently trustworthy to be accorded the status of competent evidence." 7
Of recent date, the Supreme Court of California in the case of
People v. Jones,38 departed from most precedents and allowed the defense
134. Mack, Forensic Psychiatry and the Witiess-A survey, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. Rxv.
302 (1958).
135. 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956); Notes, 46 Ky. LJ. 165 (1957), 35 TEXAs L.
REv. 600 (1957). See also Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U.
CHI. L. REv. 601 (1947) ; Silving, Testing the Unconscious in Crimial Cases, 69 HAIv.
L. REv. 683 (1956).
136. The use of pharmacological agents as aids in the study of personality struc-
ture is not new to psychiatry, and police investigators have frequently employed narco-
analysis (or narcosynthesis) in criminal interrogation. Drugs such as scopolamine and
the barbiturates (sodium pentothal and sodium amytal) alter the metabolism of the
central nervous system and effect psychological adjustment, but they are not "truth
sera." Though common parlance refers to these drugs as "truth sera," the drug used
in any given case is not a serum and does not insure telling of the truth.
137. Courts have been fairly consistent in their refusal to recognize the results of
scientifically conducted truth-searching tests. State v. Thomas, 79 Ariz. 158, 285 P.2d
612 (1955) ; Knight v. State, 97 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1957) ; State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M.
157, 243 P.2d 325 (1952); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495, cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951). In Brown v. State, 304 P.2d 361 (Okla. Crim. 1957), the
Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma admitted testimony of a hospital superintendent
relative to defendant's sanity though use of sodium pentothal was made during examina-
tion. The opinion pointed out, however, that narcoanalysis constituted but a small por-
tion of the total examination and the record clearly indicated that defendant's mental
condition was not determined by narcoanalysis alone. Therein lies the distinction be-
tween this decision and Henderson v. State, supra. See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d
1306 (1952).
138. 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954). Prior to the Jones case, California had
followed the orthodox rule that character must be proved by general reputation. See
Note, 42 CALiF. L. REv. 880 (1954). In People v. Ford, 304 N.Y. 679, 107 N.E.2d 595
(1952), the New York Court of Appeals refused to permit an expert witness to testify
with regard to defendant's ability to premeditate murder, opinion deriving from narco-
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to submit expert psychiatric opinion of the personality traits of the de-
fendant on the issue of the liklihood that he had committed the crime
of sexual abuse. The opinion was based in part on a narcoanalysis inter-
view with the defendant and was not offered for the purpose of proving
the truth of matters asserted by the defendant. The proffered evidence
was not the answers of Jones to certain inquiries, but the interrogator's
expert analysis of those answers for the purpose of determining whether
Jones was a sexual deviate.
Granted, the Jones case did represent a radical departure from ortho-
dox doctrine which limits proof of character to reputation evidence.'
But assuming that expert testimony is based upon adequate clinical ex-
amination there is scant reason for believing that controlled testimony
of this sort will do violence to trial procedures as they actually exist.
Present day restriction of character evidence to reputation testimony is
anamolous, since specific items of information inevitably find their way
into the trial scene. The character witness will be cross-examined with
regard to specific rumors and facts; the primary witness is subject to
searching cross-examination that may delve into many and varied aspects
of the witness' past. It can readily be appreciated that existing rules in
no sense restrict character analysis to reputation evidence, simply be-
cause circumvention of the rules is warranted by time honored prece-
dents. Both the Model Code of Evidence 4. and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence 41 allow presentation of opinion evidence as to personality traits.
The authors of these codes have indeed reflected upon the ignominy of
exaggerated reliance upon general reputation as a workable test.
Fears are expressed in some quarters that much valuable time will be
wasted on battles between partisan experts, and these fears are not with-
out foundation. A jury will not receive altogether trustworthy informa-
tion under this purely adversary method of presenting medical evidence,
analysis. Ten years previously this same court in People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 39
N.E.2d 925 (1942), permitted expert opinion based upon narcoanalysis. The decision
in the Jones case has been followed in People v. Brooks, 133 Cal. App. 2d 210, 283 P.2d
748 (1955) and rejected in State v. Sinnott, 24 N.J. 408, 132 A.2d 298 (1957), affirming
43 N.J. Super. 1, 127 A.2d 424 (App. Div. 1956). The Sinnwtt case has been noted in
12 RTJTGERs L. REv. 410 (1957). See Curran, Expert Psychiatric Evidence of Personal-
ity Traits, 103 U. PA. L. Rav. 999 (1955) (approving of the Jones decision) ; Falknor
and Steffen, Evideice of Character: From the "Crucible of the Community" to the
"Couch of the Psychiatrist," 102 U. PA. L. REv. 980 (1954) (disapproving) ; Note, 35
N.C.L. REv. 515 (1957). Compare People v. Spigno, 319 P.2d 458 (Cal. App. 1957),
rejecting testimony of psychologist concerning defendant's lack of lustive intent, on
ground that California Code requires opinion of psychiatrist.
139. As Mr. Justice Jackson has written in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469, 477 (1948): "The witness may not testify about defendant's . . . possession of a
particular disposition or of benign mental and moral traits ..
140. MODEL CODE OF EViDENcE rule 306 (1942).
141. UNiFoRma RULE OF EvIDExcE 46, 47.
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yet the adversary system need not dictate every facet of trial experience.
The anticipated battle between experts is a situation present whenever
expert testimony is presented, however the trial court should have broad
powers to limit expert testimony as it might limit the number of charac-
ter witnesses in any case. To insure maximum psychiatric assistance,
it might be feasible to provide for clinical examination by a court ap-
pointed psychiatrist upon a reasonable showing that one or more material
witnesses are affected with an acute personality disorder.142
Whatever course veracity-testing may take in future years, one
premise remains unobscured: that governing rules of evidence should
be geared to an all out search for the truth. Despite piecemeal reform
through judicial decision and legislative enactment, present day rules
still reflect the haphazard mold of the many common law precedents that
spawned them. Trouble lies not in the number of rules to be mastered,
but in the unnecessary confusion of ideas and the further fact that so
many carefully devised concepts work at crosspurposes. In these days
of fusion and fission, any trend toward simplicity commands welcome.
New and improved codes of civil procedure have demonstrated that
sweeping reform is neither shocking nor unsavory, and uniform ac-
ceptance of basic evidential principles would insure competent adminis-
tration of the legal process.
142. That courts have the power to appoint medical experts is clear. Authority
stems either from inherent power to call witnesses or from statutes or rules confirming
authority to summon expert testimony. 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 563 (3d ed. 1940).
Dession, Freedman, Donnelly, and Redlich, Drug-Induced Revelatirn and Criminal In-
vestigation, 62 YAL. LJ. 315 (1953).
